It says: Albert Prenkaj
Is it utopia to expect a change of dyacus?
It was a bit reliable the option that Vuciqi accepted the election results. Apparently, the profound election outcome has forced him to accept defeat, to stem potential violence, to keep calm.
Belgrade has gone through a relatively calm period during the years of protests — no violence against state institutions and no destruction of public and private property — unlike what we are witnessing in Paris and Tirana.
Founded without figures known to the public, which could represent it in forming the government, the Student List has held the traditional Serbian ethnonationalist course during the campaign, thus competing with the discus of former president Vuciq. It was a strategy to adapt to the thinking of most voters and win the elections.
The election programme and media presentations have not envisioned a policy of approaching the EU or imposing sanctions on Russia, though Vuciqi warned that, sometime in March next year, the Student List will impose sanctions on Russia.
As for Kosovo, the Serbian Student List takes a similar stance with former President Vuciq. On our journey we will witness variations in attitudes and actions.
How will Serbia’s new government behave towards dialogue with Kosovo at a time when the EU, but also official Washington, are trying to restore Serbia’s state strategy based on four pillars of Moscow, Beijing, Brussels and Washington towards European geopolitical trajectory, respectively?
Will Djindjic’s leadership be added to Serbia, both at the time of the collapse of Milosevic’s regime and Djindjic’s coming to power, considered pro-Western? Vuciqi, when he came to power, also released the pro-European charter, using it to preserve neutrality as a means of strengthening Serbia’s position.
Is it utopic to expect changing the Serbian state’s discours towards neighbours as preconditions for reopening its path towards EU integration?
Will Serbia’s approach to Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia change?
Will Serbia exceed Albania in this process, given that the latter — through violence and rejection of internal dialogue — risks remaining at large?